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Russell, Propositional Unity, and the Correspondence 
Intuition 





atarina Perovic, in her contribution to the Fall 2015 issue of the Bulletin, raises 
intriguing questions about Russell’s multiple-relation theory of judgment (MRTJ).i 
In this article, I focus on what she has to say regarding the general character of 
its precursor, the dual-relation theory of judgment (DRTJ) that is found, for example, in 
The Principles of Mathematics (1903). The matter deserves an extended comment, as it 
opens up an interesting perspective on Russell’s theories of judgment in general. I don’t 
claim to possess a key that opens every interpretative lock, here; but what I have to say 
might help some fellow-Russellians to orient themselves in a terrain where it’s easy to 
get lost. I shall consider two key elements in Russell’s thinking about judgment: (i) the 
issue of propositional unity, and (ii) the correspondence intuition. 
(DRTJ) regards propositions as complex entities composed of things plus their 
properties and relations. Russell was not at all clear as to how a proposition is 
constituted out of its constituents (I shall discuss the issue below). But, as Perovic 
emphasizes, it was Russell’s view, for example, that the proposition expressed by “Alice 
is wise” contains Alice herself and one of her properties among its constituents.  
What, then, of truth and falsehood? Perovic (p. 11) gives the following account:  
 
The proposition *Alice is wise* is true simply in virtue of the existence of the 
complex Alice being wise. But, given that there is no distinction between a 
proposition and a corresponding complex, there is really nothing informative that 
can be said about the truth of the proposition––its existence coincides with its 
being true. Even more troublingly, on this view, false propositions simply do not 
exist. Let’s say that I falsely judge that Alice is not wise. According to his 1903 
view, it would appear that I can judge no such thing since there is no such 
proposition. 
 
This may in fact be a rather accurate description of the sort of confusion to which 
Russell apparently fell victim in The Principles of Mathematics. The confusion is not an 
essential element of (DRTJ), however; and Russell himself succeeded in clearing things 
up in this respect. Moreover, setting straight the confusion will help us thinking through 
some of the twists and turns in Russell’s subsequent reflections on judgment and truth, 
as in (MRTJ) and the psychological theory of judgment that he settled upon around 
1918–19. 
What, then, is the confusion? It is to be found in the statement that a proposition’s 
“existence coincides with its being true”. Now, this can’t be; if you have a need at all for 
propositions in your philosophy, you will need both true and false propositions. This 
applies to Russell as well. We can see this easily if we consider the general character of 
(DRTJ), according to which a judgment or a belief is a dual (that is, two-place) relation 
K 
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between a subject and a proposition. Consider Russell’s favorite example of a false 
belief, Othello’s belief that Desdemona loves Cassio––this is a piece of fiction, but here 
it is to be treated as if it were real. Not only is it correct to say that Othello believes 
something, namely that Desdemona loves Cassio––it’s also correct, even if a little 
clumsy, to say that there is something such that he believes it; that is, that there is an 
entity such that Othello believes it. If a judgment is a dual relation, the inference is 
clearly legitimate. Moreover, it holds whether the belief is true or false; this is a 
fundamental assumption that Russell accepts. You can give it up if you think, with 
present day ‘disjunctivists’, that belief is not a ‘natural kind’, but you won’t find that in 
Russell. (DRTJ) is thus committed to the existence of false propositions, which are 
entities possessing the same ontological status as the true ones. 
What does a proposition’s existence consist in, then, if it does 
not consist in its truth? What is essential to existence in general is 
oneness, or being one. Applied to propositions, this means that they 
must be unities, in that while a proposition has many constituents, it 
is nevertheless one entity. In §54 of The Principles of Mathematics, 
Russell argues that this is because one of the constituents of a 
proposition is a relation that occurs in that proposition in a special 
way, as a “relation actually relating” the other constituents. This is 
why a proposition is an actual unity and more than just a list of its putative constituents. 
This cannot be the full story about the unity of the proposition, however. Keep in 
mind that on (DRTJ), the proposition *Desdemona loves Cassio* has Desdemona 
herself, Cassio himself, and the relation of loving itself as its constituents. Now, surely, if 
the relation of loving actually relates Desdemona to Cassio, then it is the case that she 
loves him; as my English dictionary tells me, the adverb ‘actually’ is ‘used to refer to 
what is true or real’. But if so, Russellian propositions collapse into facts. At one point, 
Russell even argues that what distinguishes a proposition from a list of entities “is not 
any constituent at all, but simply and solely the fact of relatedness”.ii 
To disarm the 
objection, one should argue 
that it relies on a notion of 
fact that is illegitimate in the 
context of (DRTJ). Later, 
Russell would indeed say 
that facts are complexes of 
their constituents: a fact is 
what results when a relating 
relation (or, possibly, a ‘predicating predicate’) knits together other entities. On (DRTJ), 
on the other hand, this does not yet suffice for facthood. To turn a propositional unity 
into a fact, truth has to be added to it. Unfortunately, Russell failed to explain how this 
comes about, and The Principles is very confused about the matter. But the basic point 
is just that a fact is a true proposition, or more perspicuously, propositional unity plus 
truth. 
What the above objection makes absolutely clear is that (DRTJ) must draw a 
distinction between two kinds of unity: propositional unity and fact unity. The former is 
the unity of what is believed, while the latter is the unity of what is the case. Russell may 
To turn a propositional unity into a fact, truth has to be 
added to it. Unfortunately, Russell failed to explain how this 
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have been confused about this in The Principles, but he was quite clear about it later, as 
when he argued, against Meinong, that the being of a particularized relation cannot be 
what is actually asserted in a judgment.iii A particularized relation is a concrete instance 
of a relation, like Desdemona’s love for Cassio, and the point being that if there is such 
an entity, the judgment asserting that she loved him cannot fail to be true. In the same 
way, he argued that, given (DRTJ), what is asserted––the ‘objective of the judgment’, in 
Meinong’s terminology––cannot be an event, and for the same reason: 
 
There was no such event as ‘Charles I’s death in his bed’. To say that there ever 
was such a thing as ‘Charles’s I’s death in his bed’ is merely another way of saying 
that Charles I died in his bed. Thus if there is an objective, it must be something 
other than ‘Charles I’s death in his bed’. We may take it to be ‘that Charles I died in 
his bed’. We shall then have to say the same about true judgments.iv  
 
Propositions (entities like ‘that Charles I died in his bed’) are thus the only 
candidates for entities that are judged or believed. They, unlike particularized relations 
or events, allow the duality of truth and falsehood: particularized relations and events, if 
there are such entities, are fact unities, whereas propositions in Russell’s sense are 
propositional unities. The distinction between the two kinds of unity is thus clearly drawn 
by him. This is the first element that I wanted to introduce.  
The second element is the correspondence intuition. It is a sort of gut-feeling that 
we are supposed to have about truth. As is only appropriate for what we call an 
‘intuition’, it’s readily formulated in concrete instances, as when we say that the belief 
that Charles I died on the scaffold is true because there was such an event as Charles 
I’s death on the scaffold. In our terminology, the event is a fact-unity, and it is both 
necessary and sufficient for the truth of the belief. 
Russell would later accept the gut-feeling, thus becoming one of the chief 
advocates of the correspondence theory of truth. But it is ruled out by (DRTJ), according 
to which a judgment has a proposition as its object, and a judgment is true or false in a 
derivative sense, depending on whether its object is true or false. We could say that a 
judgment is true if there is a fact ‘corresponding to it’, but since a fact is just a true 
proposition, that throws no light on the concept of truth. Given (DRTJ), furthermore, a 
proposition is an immanent feature of a judgment, rather than something external to it, 
as it should be on the correspondence conception; a judgment is an act plus 
proposition, and so a proposition is simply a part of a judgment. Again, we could say 
that a proposition is external to an act of judging, but a mere act cannot be true or false. 
So, whichever way we twist (DRTJ), we won’t get a (non-trivial) correspondence theory 
out of it. 
Truth by correspondence has to go by the board, then. Nor is there other plausible 
explanation of truth, such as pragmatism or coherence. (DRTJ) is thus committed to 
primitivism about fact unity. This is the view, as Perovic (p. 11) puts it, that “there is 
really nothing informative that can be said about the truth of the proposition”. Russell 
himself put the point as follows:  
 
Truth and falsehood, in this view, are ultimate, and no account can be given of 
what makes a proposition true or false. If we accept the view that there are 
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objective falsehoods, we shall oppose them to facts, and make truth the quality of 
facts, falsehood the quality of their opposites, which we may call fictions.v  
 
The problem here is precisely that it offends against our feeling of truth and 
falsehood. The distinction is one that we “must merely apprehend”, and hence, Russell 
argues, it leaves our preference for truth unaccounted in a way that just doesn’t feel 
right.vi 
The early Russell’s truth-primitivism has been widely noticed. What is less 
frequently observed is that (DRTJ) was committed to primitivism about propositional 
unity as well. A proposition is a unity, because it combines several entities into one. 
Russell can prevent it from collapsing into a fact unity only by insisting that there’s a 
difference here, although it’s one that cannot be analyzed or explained in any way. With 
(DRTJ), propositional unity must come out as an indefinable feature of propositions, 
along with their truth or falsehood. For instance, if you say with Russell that what makes 
for unity is the fact of relatedness, that’s just a way of saying: a proposition is one entity, 
rather than many entities, and that’s the end of the story! 
Russell is helped here a little by the theory of definite descriptions that he 
formulated in “On Denoting” (1905). It gave him a way of eliminating non-propositional 
complexity. Semantically speaking, he found a way of eliminating complex referring 
expressions, as he held now that definite descriptions (phrases like ‘the current Mayor 
of London’, which on the face of it refers to Mr. Sadiq Khan) have an implicit 
propositional structure. Given this, he could explain his ontology by saying that there are 
simple entities and there are complex entities, and the latter have constituents and a 
truth-value, while refusing any further elucidation of what is involved in this complexity. 
As far as I know, he didn’t formulate the conclusion in quite so many words. But fits in 
very well with the substitutional theory of logic that he worked out around 1905–06.vii 
Philosophically, however, the theory leaves too much in the dark. It denies all 
insight into the nature of truth and falsehood, which is bad intuitively (and for other 
reasons as well, which I won’t address here). And it denies all insight into propositional 
complexity, which leaves Russell without a reply to idealist philosophers, who put great 
emphasis on the issue of unity. Bradley confronted Russell directly with the hard 
question: “Is there anything, I ask, in a unity beside its ‘constituents,’ i.e., the terms and 
the relation, and, if there is anything more, in what does this “more” consist?”viii Russell’s 
primitivism leaves him without a reply on this point. Much has been written about why 
Russell rejected (DRTJ). There were many such reasons, both ‘logical’ and 
‘philosophical’. I submit that the explanatory poverty of the theory did play a role here. 
Turning now to (MRTJ), it’s easy to see why Russell should have found it 
attractive. It gets rid of propositions as single entities and, thereby, of propositional 
unities as mysterious primitives. There are only fact unities, and Russell can now invoke 
the notion of relating relation with a clear conscience to explain their unity: a ‘complex’ is 
a unity because there is a relation among its constituents and occurring in a special 
way, as really relating the other constituents. A complex is thus an actual unity of its 
constituents. A judgment, too, is a complex and therefore a unity because the relation of 
judging occurs in it as a relating relation. Finally, truth and falsehood can be explained 
in a way that respects the correspondence intuition, as depending on whether or not 
there exists a fact unity corresponding to the judgment.  
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This is a great improvement on (DRTJ). The phenomenon of propositional unity 
will still be there, however, even if there aren’t any propositions as single entities. 
Russell’s strategy was to explain that phenomenon by explaining how an appearance of 
propositional unity is generated from the (i) judging subject, (ii) the objects that the 
judgment is concerned with, and (iii) whatever additional explanatory machinery is 
needed to generate such an appearance from (i) and (ii). That some extra machinery is 
needed here is clear, since otherwise there would not be even an appearance of 
propositional unity but a mere list of entities. A judgment can now be said to be true if 
there exists a fact-unity (‘complex’) in which the objects of the judgment are actually 
related in the way that the appearance of unity represents them as being related: when 
Othello believes that Desdemona loves Cassio, there is Othello thinking of (1) 
Desdemona, (2) the relation of loving, and (3) Cassio, and in such a way as to generate 
an appearance of unity; and the belief is true if there’s a corresponding complex, 
Desdemona’s-loving-Cassio.  
This is just schematic, and the hard analytic task consists in explaining how the 
appearance of propositional unity comes to be. Between 1910 and 1913, Russell 
experimented with several solutions to the problem. The eventual disappearance of 
(MRTJ) is usually attributed to the criticism that Wittgenstein directed at it in 1913, 
although there’s no consensus on the point of the criticism. I won’t consider this issue 
here. Instead, I shall draw up a sketch of some of the later developments. 
Quite apart from the difficulties that Russell had in explaining the appearance of 
unity, he was forced to give up (MRTJ) when, in the process of becoming a neutral 
monist, he began to think that the judging subject, too, ought to be ‘constructed’, rather 
than ‘postulated’. The connection is made explicitly in this passage by Russell himself: 
 
The theory of belief which I formerly advocated, namely, that it consisted in a 
multiple relation of the subject to the objects constituting the ‘objective’, i.e. the fact 
that makes the belief true or false, is rendered impossible by the rejection of the 
subject. The constituents of the belief cannot, when the subject is rejected, be the 
same as the constituents of its ‘objective’.ix  
 
The point here is that if there’s no judging subject, there is nothing to produce an 
appearance of unity unless it is representations that accomplish this. This change of 
mind brought about a radical shift in Russell’s thinking about judgment. He was led to 
adopt a psychological theory of judgment, where representing is not a relationship 
between a subject and worldly objects––a subject creating an appearance of unity––but 
is in the final analysis a property of mental images: 
 
What I believe when I believe that Caesar crossed the Rubicon is not the actual 
event, which took place in 49 BC; it is a present occurrence, something that is now 
in my mind.x 
 
This promises neat solutions to Russell’s old problems: 
 
The advantages [of the psychological theory] are those derived from the 
rehabilitation of content, making it possible to admit propositions as actual complex 
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occurrences, and doing away with the difficulty of answering the question: what do 
we believe when we believe falsely?xi  
 
‘Content’ is what one believes when one believes that so-and-so––for example 
that Caesar crossed the Rubicon. If content is in a mind, it won’t give rise to the problem 
of worldly facts. Russell in fact adopted the Wittgensteinian view that contents are facts, 
a feature that he took to be crucial for their ability to represent. But now content is just a 
fact to the effect that given images stand in determinate relations to each other. A fact of 
this kind is wholly innocuous, since one can put an image of a cat and an image of a 
mat together, without as much as touching the cat and the mat.  
But if a content is in a mind, isn’t that a version of psychologism, a view that is just 
plainly false? For what I believe when I believe that Caesar crossed the Rubicon has 
nothing to do with my mind, since neither Caesar nor the pitiable river in northern Italy is 
a creature of the mind. Contents, therefore, cannot be in the mind. 
This is a familiar line of thought. Here, though, the reply is that it confuses two 
uses of the phrase ‘object of thought’: the phrase may mean (1) what we think, this 
being the sense that Russell is concerned with in the quotations above; but it may also 
mean (2) what we think about.xii When I think that Caesar crossed the Rubicon at 49 
B.C., what I think is that Caesar crossed the Rubicon at 49 B.C., while what I think 
about involves both the man and the river and, perhaps, the entire event of Caesar’s 
crossing the Rubicon in 49 B.C. Once we draw the distinction, it’s no longer clear that 
Russell was confused in the way the objection suggests. He would agree, of course, 
that what we think about is not in general in our minds; but this doesn’t show that the 
content, in the sense of what one thinks, could not be in one’s mind. 
An important dimension must nevertheless be added to the notion of content, thus 
understood. A psychological occurrence deserves to be called a ‘content’ only when it’s 
regarded as a picture or image of something else. A content is not just a psychological 
occurrence, but an occurrence plus the relationship that it bears to something external; 
this is what turns it into a picture. Russell, of course, was well aware of this, which is 
why he now argued, in The Analysis of Mind (1921) and elsewhere, that a proposition in 
the fundamental sense is a mental image possessing what he called an objective 
reference. 
Having got this far, we have to ask: What are the implications of the new 
perspective on judgment for propositional unity and the correspondence intuition? 
Keeping in mind the notion of objective reference, we can see that the old problem of 
propositional unity has not vanished but has taken on a new form, one that is familiar 
from the Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus (1921). Simply put, the question is this: what is 
a mental proposition a picture of? 
The correspondence intuition aligns truth with being and falsehood with non-being, 
as in the simple formulation that a belief is true if the entity to which it refers is there, 
while a belief is false if the entity to which it refers is not there.xiii This raises in an acute 
form a problem about reference. Russell called it the ‘problem of false belief’, although 
it’s as much a problem for the analysis of true beliefs. He was emphatic that no 
reference to non-existent or merely possible facts or states of affairs will do here, as the 
postulation of such entities testifies only to a lack of sense of reality. 
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It may be possible to answer the question regarding propositional unity in a way 
that incurs no such illicit commitments––this may have been the view of the Tractatus. 
The idea would be that a state of affairs that is merely possible has no other mode of 
being than that of being represented, and the unity of what is merely possible is the 
unity of a proposition qua fact: a proposition as a mental picture is an arrangement of 
‘pictorial elements’ showing how certain entities in the world––entities correlated with 
the elements of the picture––are arranged in the world if the proposition is true. It’s 
natural to read this formulation in a way that involves acceptance of the correspondence 
intuition in more or less its simplest form: a proposition is true if, and only if, there is 
such an arrangement of entities as the proposition depicts. The picture-theory thus 
promises to solve the problem of propositional unity in a way that lets you cling to the 
correspondence intuition.  
Russell’s development of the notion of objective reference took a rather different 
form, however; and most likely because he abhorred all versions of the simple 
formulation for their apparent commitment to entities that are merely possible or non-
existent. He argued, in such works as The Philosophy of Logical Atomism (1919) and 
The Analysis of Mind, that every atomic proposition, p, and its contradictory opposite, 
not-p, has a fact-unity as its objective reference, namely the fact which makes p true 
and not-p false, or else makes not-p true and p false––in this he was making use of 
ideas communicated by Wittgenstein in his pre-war Notes on Logic.xiv The ‘meaning’ of 
a proposition is determined by how the proposition refers to a fact––either ‘towards it’ or 
‘away from it’, as Russell put it––and no reference to anything that is merely possible or 
non-existent is needed––I won’t pause to consider whether this last claim can be made 
good.  
Like all philosophical theories, Russell’s comes at a price. In particular, there’s its 
commitment to negative facts. If p is true, it’s a fact that p, and if p is false, it’s fact that 
not-p. Hence, there are negative facts. Russell himself was delighted when he found 
himself defending such a paradoxical-sounding view, but it must be admitted that 
negative facts are problematic creatures. Here are two difficulties. 
First, a fact is supposed to be a unity, but it’s difficult to see how a negative fact 
could be one. A fact is a way for given entities to be tied together. Now, it’s a fact that 
Desdemona does not love Cassio. We should say, then, that things’ not being tied 
together is one way for them to be tied together. I’m not sure that I can see how this 
could be. 
Secondly, the question arises: What’s the difference between positive and 
negative facts? Russell is clear that they don’t have different constituents, because a 
negation is not an entity and cannot therefore be a constituent. Rather, the difference is 
in their having opposing qualities, positive and negative, a difference that is “ultimate 
and irreducible”.xv One question this raises is: What are we to say of truth and 
falsehood? And the reply must be: an atomic proposition is true if the fact which is its 
objective reference has positive quality, and the negation of an atomic proposition is 
true if the fact which is its objective reference has a negative quality. What a definition of 
truth accomplishes for atomic propositions is just such a correlation of truth and 
falsehood with two primitive qualities of facts.  
Technically, this doesn’t belong with truth-primitivism. The distinction between 
truth and falsehood is not just left there to be apprehended, but is grounded in facts and 
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their opposing qualities. Here, however, one may feel that the ground that Russell has 
identified is unsatisfactory, and somewhat in the way that truth primitivism was found to 
be unsatisfactory. At any rate, Russell himself now issued the familiar-sounding 
complaint that the ‘purely formal definition of truth and falsehood’, which establishes a 
connection between propositions and facts, is inadequate because it does not throw any 
light upon our preference for true beliefs rather than false ones”.xvi What is needed, he 
adds, is a story that takes into account the causal efficacy of our beliefs. 
The suggested remedy indicates, it seems to me, that the trouble here is at bottom 
not with any of the details of the formal truth definition but with the very idea of such an 
enterprise. With some plausibility, we may attribute to the Russell of the 1920s some 
such line of thought as the following. The difficulties regarding the unity of negative facts 
and their capability to act as truth-grounds point in the direction of a ‘deflationary’ 
account of facts. Once we cease to think of facts as complex entities, we can sidestep 
these problems and avail ourselves of a smooth-running, ‘formal’ definition of truth. 
Such a definition decrees, for example, that “Brutus killed Caesar” is true because of the 
fact that Brutus killed Caesar. And this, Russell now argues, “keeps us in the verbal 
realm, and does not get us outside it to some realm of non-verbal fact”.xvii You could 
take issue with that, but here the important point is that, as Russell now sees it, the 
language-world connection is not to be understood through a formal definition of truth 
but with the help of what is at bottom a causal theory of meaning. 
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